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ABSTRACT. Adaptive management has become increasingly common where natural resource managers
face complex and uncertain conditions. The collaboration required among managers and others to do
adaptive management, however, is not always easy to achieve. We describe efforts to work with villagers
and government officials in Malinau, East Kalimantan Indonesia, where a weak, uncertain institutional
setting and complex shifting political landscape made formal cooperation among these groups for forest
management problematic. Through successive trials, the team learned instead to work with and enhance a
“spontaneous order” of cooperation using four tactics: (1) continuous physical presence, (2) regular contact
with the people who advised and were close to major decision makers, (3) maintenance of multiple programs
to fit the needs of different interest groups, and (4) hyperflexibility in resource allocation and schedules.
Key Words: Key words: adaptive collaborative management; Borneo; chaos; Kalimantan; spontaneous
cooperation.
INTRODUCTION
Adaptive collaborative management (ACM) has
become widely accepted as an approach for
facilitating decisions about natural resources in
complex, uncertain environments in which decision
making among interest groups is required (Chess et
al. 1998, Sinclair and Smith 1999, Wondolleck and
Yaffee 2000, Buck et al. 2001, Colfer 2005).
However, ACM assumes that cooperation among
different groups can be guided in predictable ways.
We suggest, to the contrary, that cooperation itself
can be chaotic and uncertain, especially during
times of political or organizational instability. How
can ACM work under such conditions?
In this article we show that adaptive collaborative
management in “chaotic” institutional contexts can
benefit from the recognition and use of spontaneous
cooperation among decision makers. Working with
spontaneous cooperation requires special methods
that bring particular challenges. We illustrate our
case with examples from Malinau District, in East
Kalimantan, Indonesia from 1998 to 2005, where
our action research team used ACM to facilitate
collaboration among communities and government
to improve equity, incomes, and sustainable forest
management, but did so during times of high
political uncertainty and instability.
LIMITS TO COLLABORATION
Adaptive management of natural resources has
emerged over the past 20 yr as a way of coping with
uncertainty, rapid change, and the complexity of
whole systems (Holling 1978, Walters 1986,
Poteete and Welch 2004). Adaptive management is
decision making informed by a learning process: (1)
setting management objectives; (2) implementing a
decision to achieve the objectives; (3) observing
outcomes and assessing against objectives; and (4)
as necessary, adjusting the practice though a new
decision (Lee 1993). Drawing on complexity and
organizational theory, adaptive managers have tried
to become more open to surprise, accident, and
serendipity, and “welcome disorder positively”
(Axelrod and Cohen 1999, Rosenhead 1998:6).
They develop explicit learning strategies by seeking
newly developing information that suggests new
opportunities and emerging patterns of the
organization and its environment (Senge 1990,
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Sanders 1998, Stacey 2003). Managers seek to have
an active, iterative engagement with their
environment and work in a flexible, responsive way
that builds on their experience. Monitoring the
environment is a key feature of the approach.
When different interest groups share a stake in a
resource, such as forests, collaborative management
can help meet these different groups' needs.
Adaptive collaborative management (ACM) is thus
adaptive management in which different interest
groups engage in the cyclical learning process
together (Buck et al. 2001, Colfer 2005). These
approaches work best when strong communication,
trust, coordination, and legitimate decision making
and authority occur or can be built through improved
relationships and institutions (Stacey 2003, Colfer
2005).
Unfortunately, under some circumstances, organizations
find it difficult to build the relationships and
institutions that support collaborative learning.
Social unrest and political upheaval can result in a
lack of capable institutions to mediate conflict or
legitimize decisions. This, in turn, can reduce
communication and trust among and within
organizations. Organizations can have their own
internal crises as well, due to a lack of capacity,
leadership crisis, external pressures, or internal
reform.
Ironically, ACM is intended to cope with complex
external contexts, but has not addressed how to cope
with complexity internal to decision making and
management. How can decision makers cope with
their own chaos and not just chaos in their
environment?
In this article, we focus on this seeming
contradiction to ask how collaborative learning is
possible in unstable contexts and what methods are
required to achieve it. We give special attention to
cooperation among decision makers for its
importance in supporting both collaborative
learning and management.
Chaos and spontaneous orders
Chaos models provide one way of understanding
how ACM practitioners can achieve cooperation
under conditions of instability. Chaos theory
predicts that when a system moves from equilibrium
to instability, it passes through a state of bounded
instability in which stability and instability operate
at the same time, and cause and effect disappear
(Stacey 2003). We propose that natural resource
managers often face bounded instability during
times of massive change, as they face a mix of
controllable and uncontrollable conditions such as
volatile markets, policy changes, social unrest, or
natural catastrophes.
We have observed, however, that practitioners of
ACM readily recognize chaos and bounded
instability in their environment, but rarely address
it in their own decision making. ACM can benefit
from work in organizational learning theory that
acknowledges internal chaos and identifies its
predictabilities (Senge 1990, Stacey 2003).
According to organizational learning theory, during
bounded instability, behavior has a spontaneous,
self-organized emergent pattern that is irregular and
highly complex (Stacey 2003). The emergent
pattern often occurs at new scales, e.g., smaller or
larger groups, longer or shorter decision-making
cycles. The pattern is itself subject to vary with small
changes in the environment and it is impossible to
know the long-term future.
Hot groups are an example of such an emergent
pattern and have been prescribed by some as a way
for organizations to be more responsive to rapidly
changing environments (Lipman-Blumen and
Leavitt 1999). Hot groups do not constitute a
structural unit in an organization. People come
together voluntarily and spontaneously because of
common interests. The groups organize themselves
quickly, are flexible, and have high motivation and
capacity for innovation.
When bounded instability occurs among ACM
decision makers, cooperation among them can thus
be viewed as a self-organized, spontaneous,
emergent pattern that is likely to take place at scales
different from what ordinary, formal decision
making would suggest. Scale refers here to different
levels or degrees of social organization or decision
making. The emergent, spontaneous order of
cooperation cannot be guided by a single
organization or hierarchical entity. Instead, people
pursue their own ends and mutually adjust to each
other to form cooperative arrangements across the
boundaries of their usual activities. In the remainder
of the paper, we use the terms spontaneous orders
of cooperation, spontaneous cooperation, or orders
interchangeably for ease of reference.
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Spontaneous orders of cooperation can have
advantages over designed cooperation. Competition
can exist among parties and can promote more
rigorous outcomes as it does in the way self-
organized practice of science, free markets, or
democracy (diZerega 2000). Spontaneous orders of
cooperation can also incorporate more complex
relationships and information as they are not limited
by people’s cognitive and organizational skills
(diZerega 2000).
One of the disadvantages, however, is that
spontaneous orders tend to be dissipative structures
(Nicolis and Prigogine 1989) that require “great
effort to retain its structure and relatively little to
change it,” in contrast to the equilibrium structure
that “requires no effort to retain its structure and
great effort to change it.” (Stacey 2003:226).
Staying in this state is therefore not efficient, as it
requires continuous inputs of energy, attention, and
information (Rosenhead 1998, Stacey 2003).
However, managers can benefit from the innovation
and opportunities they yield.
Chaos models therefore suggest that it may be
imprudent to engineer formal cooperation during
times of instability. Rather, people should try to
work with spontaneous orders of cooperation as
they emerge. By better understanding spontaneous
cooperation, certain elements of what appears to be
chaos become more predictable. Efforts should be
directed at identifying the more predictable
opportunities for cooperation and being responsive
to how those opportunities change. It should be
recognized that trying to maintain or manage
spontaneous orders of cooperation may be
expensive due to the requirement for continuous
inputs and difficulty of predicting how the orders
will evolve.
MALINAU AND THE POLICY TRANSITION
The district of Malinau is in the endangered “heart
of Borneo,” where broad expanses of Dipterocarp
forest constitute one of the last large forest areas of
Southeast Asia (Fig. 1). Nearly all of Malinau is
state forestland. Most of the district’s 40,000
inhabitants practice swidden agriculture and
hunting and gathering from the forest. They include
more than 20 ethnic groups, including the largest
group of Punan hunter-gatherers in Borneo. Most
accessible lowland forests are now degraded as a
result of logging and extensive swidden cultivation.
The Malinau River watershed is the most densely
populated area of the district, and the most
developed. About 6,673 people lived in the 500,000
ha watershed in 2003 (Malinau Voting Census
2003).
After 32 yr of repressive authoritarian rule, the fall
of the Suharto regime in May 1998 initiated a surge
of dramatic political reforms and uncertainty
throughout Indonesia. Policy reforms gave more
control to district governments, including the right
to reap more benefits from local economic activities
and for people to choose their own representatives.
Reforms decreased government censorship and
intimidation and allowed people to protest and
address conflicts more openly (Wulan et al. 2004).
Widespread euphoria about the possibilities for
more democracy resulted, but so did widespread
confusion, as most institutions were not yet ready
for the new rights and responsibilities thrust upon
them.
Forest-rich parts of Indonesia, such as Malinau,
experienced enormous instability during these
reforms. Local governments suddenly had
opportunities to capture timber profits that had
previously gone to the central government and
concession holders. The districts immediately
mobilized small-scale timber harvesting in their
areas (Barr et al. 2001, Limberg et al. 2004). From
April 2000 to August 2001, Malinau District issued
46 cutting permits granting access to more than
60,000 ha in Malinau. At the same time, local
communities felt empowered to make claims to
forestland and to demand compensation for
damages. Confusion about the classification of land
functions and conflict over claims to forestland
increased exponentially, with more than 69 cases of
conflict occurring between 2000 and 2002,
compared to only 8 during the Soeharto period
(Sudana 2004:2). The central government made
numerous attempts to stop logging. With the
passage of a regulation in 2002, the Ministry of
Forestry made the district cutting permits illegal.
Decentralization also led to the creation of new
districts in Indonesia. Malinau formed in October
1999 as a split-off from the District of Bulungan.
The district pieced together its staff largely from
local teachers, educated villagers, and lower level
administrators. Malinau’s administrative capacities
were thus extremely weak. Most officials were
poorly informed about the policy, and many lacked
experience. For example, the district forestry
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Fig. 1. District of Malinau, Indonesian Borneo.
service, land registering agency, and coordinating
agency could not agree about the ownership status
of forestland in the district or the legal basis for
allocating it.
Because reforms created a mandate for more
populist politics, some officials made exorbitant
promises to communities. Communities, in turn,
made exorbitant demands and happily exercised
their right to disregard government authority.
Communities and officials tried to work out deals
with each other and with the timber companies that
would best serve their interests. There was no model
or standard that people could follow to gauge what
was “right” behavior in the new system. Everything
was fluid and up for grabs.
The turmoil of the transition lessened in 2003 as
small-scale timber licenses become illegal and
officials settled into their roles. However, enormous
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uncertainties persisted. In 2006, district government
and local people still contested their roles in forest
management and how the forest should be used.
Facilitating collaboration
In Malinau, policy reforms enabled ethnic divides
and competition across all sectors of society to give
some people new influence, while marginalizing
others, especially communities in forest areas. The
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
sought to assist forest communities to increase their
access and control over forest benefits and
decisions. This aim included trying to improve
income opportunities for communities, and rights
to forest and land and management.
We used adaptive collaborative management
(ACM) with local partners to determine
interventions. As researchers used to facilitating
information flows, our interventions focused on
improving communication, joint learning, conflict
management and deliberation. We facilitated
relationships among communities and between
communities and government. Activities focused
on the 27 forest villages in a single watershed near
Malinau in which forest management and income
opportunities were especially volatile. CIFOR was
committed to working in this part Malinau as a long-
term research site. Individuals from the
communities and government participated as
partners and beneficiaries.
Our core team, i.e., the “CIFOR team,” drove the
adaptive learning process by periodically reflecting
upon our activities and revising our strategy for
interventions. We monitored our impact through
routine surveys of villages every 3-6 mo, as well as
through evaluations of major activities. Informal
observation of experiences was also important. The
team of 5–7 members had expertise in community
outreach, forest conservation, community-based
management, mapping, anthropology, and agriculture,
with long-term experience in Kalimantan. Three
members were from local villages.
Initiated in 1998, our work had five components.
Each component served as a learning cycle that
informed the next: villagers'
 
1. Village surveys and monitoring to understand
local concerns and conditions
We conducted surveys in 1998 to orient
ourselves to design locally relevant
programs. We found it useful to continue
visits to villages to monitor reform
developments and our impact. Villagers or
government officials sometimes participated.
Monitoring included observations of the
forest, as well as economic, political, and
social conditions.
2. Participatory mapping and village agreements
In response to villagers' interests villagers' to
demarcate their customary lands, we
mediated conflicts over village boundaries
and facilitated mapping among villages from
January to July 2000. The team did not
complete the mapping due to the difficulty of
maintaining boundary agreements and lack
of endorsement from the district government
(Anau et al. 2002). The reform period was at
its most chaotic during this time. The
experience indicated that Malinau lacked
institutions to secure legal recognition of
claims to land. To address this gap, we
worked with local people and officials to
develop principles to develop stable
agreements and manage conflict.
3. Legal awareness and policy dialog
Following the need for improved institutions,
starting in 2001 we facilitated awareness
building and policy dialogue among
government officials and communities about
multistakeholder land use planning, public
participation, representation, customary
rights, and the use of public forests as sources
of village revenue. We shared information on
these topics through informal discussions,
policy briefs, newsletters, sharing of the
regulations and laws, workshops, and cross
visits.
4. Community participation in district land use
planning
In 2001, Malinau started preparation of a land
use plan, rencana tata ruang. We saw this as
a practical opportunity to enable communities
to have more influence over forest decisions
and access to forestland. We worked to link
village and district-level land use decision
making. Relationships with the district were
cool. Officials distrusted our motives, as our
aim was to empower communities. Although
we established an MOU, several committees,
and a workplan with the district, the formality
of these measures only distanced us further.
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Few villagers knew that the district was
developing a land use plan, so we helped them
analyze their land use priorities and report
these to the district. Officials and the technical
consultants did not value the input from
villagers. We had difficulty coordinating with
officials, as their schedules changed
frequently at the last minute. The interest in
collaboration of the more powerful
community and government groups declined
when they realized there was no money
available, whereas more marginalized groups
increasingly sought us out.
It was during this time that we first recognized
the importance of spontaneous cooperation.
Watching the plethora of deal making around
us, we realized that officials and villagers
were able to cooperate easily enough with one
another to exploit timber, and found this more
interesting than our efforts to support formal
land use planning. To increase our relevance
to communities and the government, we
decided to “go with the flow” to facilitate
villages in identifying forest-based enterprise
options that could be supported by
government. We took a more flexible,
informal approach and worked with fewer
villages to give them more individualized
attention.
5. Village economic development and land use
In 2002 we began facilitating the
development of new economic uses of forest
in four villages. We developed a congenial
collaboration with the newly formed District
Village Empowerment Service (PMD),
which shared similar values of community
development and had few vested interests in
timber. Unfortunately, PMD was not a very
powerful agency, and again, villagers saw
little responsiveness to their requests for
enhancing gaharu, rattan, or rubber
production in their areas.
In this final phase, we worked more directly
with communities again, as collaboration
with the district had created more of a burden
than a help. With some facilitation, villagers
did inventories of their community forests to
assess the potential for their preferred land
use plan and drew up future scenarios,
management plans, and work plans. With
officials, we relied on coincidental
convergences of interests to guide collaboration
rather than trying to plan. For example, in
2004 we sponsored a provincial research and
development office to train local people how
to inoculate Aquilaria trees with a fungus to
produce gaharu, a fragrant wood worth up to
USD 1,000/kg. One of the government
officials at the workshop suggested to the
district leader that the local government
initiate a gaharu planting program. Six
months later the district launched their
“Movement for planting one million gaharu
trees.” As the inoculation carried out during
the training yielded positive results,
communities purchased and planted hundreds
of gaharu seedlings in mid-2005.
 
Facilitating by muddling through
Our capacity to be flexible in our facilitation
strategy was key to working with spontaneous
cooperation. We made adjustments by “muddling
through” (Lindblom 1959), using available limited
information and evaluating only a few,
incrementally different alternatives at a time.
Muddling through is thought to yield positive
outcomes when the outcomes of decisions are hard
to predict, and so the risks of radical change are high
(Bendor 1995). Muddling through is also a practical
way to make sense of the messiness of complexity
(Bernstein and Fortun 1998). We suggest such
muddling is more realistic than the more
comprehensive and routine information requirements
suggested by more formal scientific adaptive
management practice or participatory action
research.
Each cycle of activity evolved in the context of work
that preceded it and reflected our own deeper
understanding and embeddedness in Malinau. Over
time, we found that small, but incrementally
significant achievements occurred because of
fortuitous circumstances, e.g., a chance meeting
with an influential person, a coincidence of interests
among key actors, an unexpected event providing
an opportunity for influence. An issue raised
coincidentally with the right person at the right time
resulted in action. These coincidences became as
important to achieving our objectives as our
purposeful activities. We learned to increase the
possibility for these opportunities through four
tactics.
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The most important tactic was to have staff
physically present in the area and interact often with
different groups. By “being around,” we increased
our opportunities for informal interactions with
people, which was more conducive to building trust
and relationships. We also increased the likelihood
of chance meetings with the gatekeepers. These
were people with authority, influence, and control;
the movers and shakers who could short-cut the
bureaucracy and get things done. These included
the district leader and agency heads who, under
formal circumstances, would have been harder to
meet and were less communicative. Other people
were able to find us more easily to provide
information they thought we needed to know,
including invitations to events, news of cancelled
plans, their understanding of hidden motives, or an
alternative interpretation of the discourse
surrounding an issue. Opportunities for spontaneous
cooperation with more marginalized groups also
increased, as they became more confident in
knowing where to find us.
The second tactic was to work informally and build
relationships with the support network of the
gatekeepers. The support network included people
who advised or influenced the gatekeepers, people
who knew and organized schedules, and people who
had the latest inside information about decisions.
From these interactions we were able to learn the
timing of ad hoc gatherings and events and the
interests that motivated different groups to
participate in different events. These factors were
the key determinants of being able to engage with
spontaneous cooperation in Malinau.
The third tactic was to maintain multiple strands of
activities with different stakeholders. We found it
easier to have separate programs of work among
communities and local government, rather than one
joint program. In this way, the priorities of different
groups could be met, there was less need for
coordination, and one group did not depend on
another to take action. For example, one village was
more concerned with developing opportunities for
commercial timber production and harvesting,
whereas another wanted to stop logging and
promote ecotourism. We worked with each
independently, while also facilitating district-level
officials to discuss priorities for the district land use
plan. Nevertheless, we continued to create
opportunities for groups to meet.
The fourth tactic was to maintain hyperflexibility in
our schedule and resources. We learned to be ready
to reorganize our plans and reallocate staff at the
last minute to take advantage of sudden
opportunities, as well as routinely adjust our
strategy. Maintaining this flexibility was the most
difficult, costly, and frustrating aspect of
facilitation. It required adequate contingency funds
to cover changing travel or workshop plans.
However, it also reaped significant gains at times,
enabling us to have more frequent engagement with
policy makers and catch timely opportunities for
having policy input. Being flexible meant accepting
inefficiencies, hence the aptness of the muddling
metaphor. We explicitly acknowledged the risks
and inefficiencies that team members encountered
and tried to provide them with extra support to cope
with it. Ultimately, there were limits to the risk and
inefficiency that we could tolerate, and we needed
to regularly evaluate overall gains or losses.
Our most successful efforts at institutionalization
were in building capacity of individuals and in
working with like-minded agencies. In the spirit of
working with spontaneous cooperation, we felt that
it would be unwise to invest in more intensive
institutionalization. We do not expect the meetings
we have facilitated to be continued in their current
form, but we do expect that the types of relationships
and activities in which communities and
government engage will be affected. In this way, we
may have had a small impact on future collaborative
learning.
Outcomes
Our muddling efforts had some outcomes and
impacts according to evaluations conducted in 2003
and 2006 by people external to our program.
Although there were few hard, visible changes in
forest benefits and influence over decisions in
communities, the intermediate outcomes of
building collaboration and new awareness were
significant. According to a 2003 survey of 52
villagers, most respondents felt that the program:
 
l
 Expanded our thinking, thereby helping us to
understand conditions elsewhere, increasing
our information and experience, and
providing feedback about our situation;
 
Ecology and Society 12(1): 3
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art3/
l
 Helped our community advance and develop,
and provided input to community through
advice and explanations;
 
l
 Improved relationships among villages,
reduced conflicts, and helped with boundaries;
 
l
 Helped to bridge communities and
government; and
 
l
 Improved awareness about forest conservation.
 Villagers also observed that the program created
little tangible economic benefits for communities
and were frustrated that CIFOR did not take a more
active role in technical forest management or
income generation. People were most pleased with
the gaharu inoculation activity for its direct
economic value. One village also successfully
protected its forest with help from the program.
Some officials, particularly in the district forestry
department, were predictably negative about our
work, as it exposed and discouraged the
uncontrolled nature of logging in Malinau.
Generally, less influential villagers and government
organizations were more positive about the impacts
of our work. The mix of views and interests in
collaboration reflected the reality of the values of
the different groups involved. In a project intended
to empower a marginalized group, it may be difficult
to prevent other groups from feeling threatened.
Facilitating collaboration requires specific strategies
for dealing with each group. It also means being
prepared to have some groups try to undermine your
goals and handle conflict with authorities.
Over time, as the district established itself and
CIFOR became a better known and trusted entity,
responses became even more positive. In the 2006
survey of 65 people, i.e., 28 villagers from 13
villages and 37 government officials, 80% of the
respondents agreed that the results of CIFOR’s
research, including non ACM projects, were useful
for improving their knowledge about forests and
conservation. Nearly all, i.e., 97%, said it was
important for CIFOR to continue working in
Malinau.
The responses suggest that facilitating cooperation
and shared learning are valued, despite their
intangibility. Like Castellanet and Jordan (2002),
we believe that the biggest accomplishment of this
type of action research is change in capacities and
attitudes. Getting different groups to talk freely with
each other about their needs is already a big
achievement (Hagmann 1999). We hope that over
time, these small changes will support concrete
action.
Working with spontaneous cooperation made the
chaotic environment more predictable and
manageable. Although we might have been more
effective in a more stable environment, we did not
have that choice due to institutional commitments
of CIFOR to Malinau. We believe that many
decision makers find themselves in similar
situations in which they have to cope with chaos,
whether they want to or not.
Although working in a less chaotic environment
would have been more efficient, working in chaotic
environments may have other advantages. The
relationships formed under often dramatic
circumstances built deeper levels of trust than
otherwise possible in a short time. People were more
receptive to innovative ideas and social
arrangements. Our goal of empowering marginal
groups might have been less successful working
with more entrenched policies and social structures.
CONCLUSION
Existing models of adaptive collaborative
management or other simple platforms for
collaboration (Hemmati 2002) are unlikely to work
in places like Malinau, at least not with socially just
and long-term outcomes. These approaches
presume communication and trust exist or can be
built easily, and that clear institutions for
deliberation, agreements, checks and balances, and
managing conflict are in place. In Malinau, and
elsewhere with weakly developed civil society or
states with low capacities, these conditions do not
exist. The high transaction costs of collaboration
and possibilities for co-optation or unsustainability
are too high.
The alternative, as chaos theory helps to show, is to
learn to work with spontaneous orders of
cooperation. Working with spontaneous cooperation
requires a more embedded and informal approach
that includes being physically present in an area;
maintaining close relations with the people who
support gatekeepers; developing programs for
multiple interest groups; and being hyperflexible.
This approach identifies and builds on
predictabilities that exist in chaotic systems.
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This form of adaptive management requires
accepting a “muddling through” attitude and coping
with resulting risk and inefficiencies. Learning
opportunities need to be built into schedules
explicitly, with generous amounts of time allowed.
Reflection processes need to be creative and
efficient so as to maintain their appeal. Facilitation
strategies need to be flexible enough to respond to
changing opportunities, yet not change so often that
other groups do not understand the purpose or
direction of the work. In Malinau, adjusting
strategies about once a year seemed to work. These
changes were incremental and built iteratively upon
earlier strategies. Adjustment does not mean abrupt
departure from objectives and established
processes. Facilitators need to allow enough time to
really test and evaluate their strategies before they
change them.
The strength of the informal, muddling approach to
adaptive management is that it can increase the
relevance of facilitation to local circumstances.
Information is more accurate, in-depth, and
comprehensive, especially in terms of hearing
different perspectives from different groups.
Facilitation more closely mirrors how local policies
are made and therefore enables the facilitators to
take advantage of different waves of opportunity to
initiate new cycles of work and to engage different
groups at times of maximum impact. It is more
possible to carve out the space to work
independently, as we did with villagers on their
proposals to government or village land use plans,
or to monitor village conditions with officials in the
Empowerment Service without battling the
resistance of other offices. Officials are less likely
to co-opt the agenda. Social relationships are more
embedded.
The weakness of this approach is that it entails risks
and inefficiencies. As chaos theory suggests for
dissipative structures, spontaneous cooperation
requires continuous input to be maintained. The
frustrations and constant reallocation of resources
associated with hyperflexibility can impose severe
costs. The approach requires a team that can be
tolerant of such demands and have the forbearance
to sustain their own motivation. When working
more informally, it can be hard to have the same
level of transparency and credibility acquired
through more formal cooperation. Special efforts
need to be made to get the endorsements of
gatekeepers and to share information intensively.
From a research perspective, it is more difficult to
collect consistent information for comparisons.
Despite the weaknesses, such approaches may be
the best choice for facilitators in unstable times.
Muddling is often the only practical option. The
facilitator needs to judge whether enough
incremental gains are being made in a given period
to warrant the effort and the opportunity costs of the
efforts. Sometimes it will be better to wait for more
stable conditions, although there can be less room
for innovation or building relationships during such
times.
The selection of methods in any site is itself an
iterative and adaptive “muddling” process. We do
not suggest that the approach we took in Malinau is
necessarily the best to take elsewhere. These
decisions are highly dependent on resources
available to the facilitators, their own capacities, and
the environment in which they are working. We
think that these sorts of approaches contribute to a
more democratic and feasible way of facilitating
change. Our goal has not been to directly facilitate
collaboration, rather it has been to create an enabling
environment for accommodating interests and their
coordination, especially of weaker groups. This is
a messy muddling process, but it is also a reality of
political change.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art3/responses/
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